![]() ![]() This paper responds to Klein's objection to foundationalism, the crucial reasons for which he offers in several of his works concerning infinitism and the Regress Problem: i) that foundationalism inevitably leads either to arbitrariness or to the continuation of the regress of reasons ii) that a proposition continuously enhanced by reasons has more epistemic warrant than a proposition supported by a chain of reasons which ends at basic beliefs, and iii) that basic beliefs are not tantamount to fully justified beliefs. ![]() Klein's successful effort in reviving the often-dismissed solution and further advancing it as the sole solution to the Regress Problem cannot be ignored as he finds it necessary to not only raise problems for the viability of the three contenders but, more so, definitively invalidate them as equally possible solutions. Since the resurgence of infinitism in contemporary epistemology, Peter Klein has been consistent in providing arguments against the three other possible solutions (i.e., foundationalism, coherentism, skepticism) to the Regress Problem, which in turn is a key aspect of the justification condition for the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief. It will be further suggested that the failure of these views on justification is not coincidental, but is actually a consequence of deeper and tacitly held problematic epistemological assumptions (namely, the requirements of justificatory generality and epistemic priority), whose acceptance paves the way towards a generalized scepticism about empirical justification. Yet, it will be argued that 1) none of the examined theories is successful as a theory of justification of our empirical beliefs, and that 2) they also fall short of being adequate theories of metajustification. These theories are initially put forward as theories about the justification of our empirical beliefs however, in fact they also attempt to provide a successful response to the question of their own ‘metajustification’. In this paper, we shall describe and critically evaluate four contemporary theories which attempt to solve the problem of the infinite regress of reasons: BonJour's ‘impure’ coherentism, BonJour's foundationalism, Haack's ‘foundherentism’ and Dancy's pure coherentism. ![]()
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